This treatise on aesthetics criticizes various psychological theories of art, offers new theories and interpretations, and draws important inferences concerning ...

What is science? How is scientific knowledge affected by the society that produces it? Does scientific knowledge directly correspond to reality? Can we draw a line between science and pseudo-science? Will it ever be possible for computers to undertake scientific investigation independently? Is there such a thing as feminist science? In this book the author addresses questions such as these using a technique of 'cognitive play', which creates and explores new links between the ideas and results of contemporary history, philosophy, (...) and sociology of science. New ideas and approaches are applied to a wide range of case studies, many of them from controversial and contested science. This book will be of interest to historians and sociologists of science, to anyone interested in science studies, and to educated general readers with an interest in the history, philosophy, and social context of science. (shrink)

This early work by Robin G. Collingwood was originally published in 1939 and we are now republishing it with a brand new introductory biography. 'An Autobiography' is the story of Collingwood's personal and academic life. Robin George Collingwood was born on 22nd February 1889, in Cartmel, England. He was the son of author, artist, and academic, W. G. Collingwood. He was greatly influenced by the Italian Idealists Croce, Gentile, and Guido de Ruggiero. Another important influence was his father, a professor (...) of fine art and a student of Ruskin. He published many works of philosophy, such as Speculum Mentis (1924), An Essay on Philosophic Method (1933), and An Essay on Metaphysics (1940). (shrink)

Of these lines Markland wrote in 1728 ‘patet ignari cuiusdam et barbari interpolatoris esse’; Dr. Trapp in 1735 found them ‘in themselves flat, and improper, and altogether unworthy of Virgil’; ‘in his ipsis miror qui factum sit ut Viri Doctissimi non agnouerint orationis uim et elegantiam’ ; ‘finding in them … all Virgil's usual ease and suavity … [we] hail those verses with joy, and reinstate them in their rightful … position as the commencing verses of the great Roman epic’ (...) ; ‘uersus praeclarissimos iniuria poeta abiudicauerunt editores plerique’. (shrink)

The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification has been of undisputed theoretical importance in a wide range of contemporary epistemological debates. Yet there are a host of intimately related issues that have rarely been discussed in connection with this distinction. For instance, the distinction not only applies to an individual’s beliefs, but also to group beliefs and to various other attitudes that both groups and individuals can take: credence, commitment, suspension, faith, and hope. Moreover, discussions of propositional and doxastic justification (...) have rarely focused on broader meta-epistemological issues, and yet meta-epistemological positions can have important implications for first-order views about this distinction. This volume addresses these and other issues by bringing together 16 essays that advance the state-of-the-art thinking on propositional and doxastic justification and explore how such thinking shapes and is shaped by a range of issues previously neglected in contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

This paper presents evidence and arguments against an interpretation of david Hume's idea of history which insists that he held to a static conception of human nature. This interpretation presumes that hume lacks a genuine historical perspective, and that consequently his notion of historiography contains a fallacy (viz., Of the universal man). It is shown here that this interpretation overlooks an important distinction between methodological and substantive uniformity in hume's discussion of human nature and action. When this distinction is appreciated, (...) the above criticisms appear misrepresentative of hume's ideas of history, human nature, and their connection. A different interpretation of these concepts is then developed. (shrink)

What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...) attitude D towards p at t is not within S’s effective control at t. All three natural replies to the puzzle have been pursued. Some have claimed that doxastic attitudes like believing that p are, in fact, within our effective control, or sufficiently so. Others have claimed that doxastic ought-claims, strictly speaking, are always false. And some have denied that effective control is required for the adequacy of doxastic ought-claims in general. I here pursue and examine a different strategy. In the first part of this paper, I argue that these claims are not only each true but actually not in tension with each other in the first place. Instead of attempting to dispel the puzzle, this solution proposes to evade it instead: to solve it by properly understanding, and by thereby accepting without contradiction, all of its constitutive claims. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the evasive strategy forces us to re-think our understanding of the place of normative reasons in epistemology. More exactly, it seems to come at the cost of one central way of thinking about our reasons for having doxastic attitudes, one where such reasons are good-standing exemplars of normative reasons in general. The evasive strategy, that is, threatens to lead us very quickly to a deflationary picture of epistemic normativity: it rescues normative talk, but sacrifices normative substance. I conclude by explaining why I think this is more consequential than some have made it out to be, and by suggesting that these consequences are welcome nonetheless. (shrink)

On Aen. 2. 277 DServius notes ‘non sine ratione etiam hoc de crinibus dolet Aeneas, quia illis maxime Hector commendabatur, adeo ut etiam tonsura ab eo nomen acceperit, sicut Graeci poetae docent.’ Fraenkel showed that the reference in Graeci poetae is to Lycophron , the source of the comment being provided by Eustathius 1276. 29, a scholion on Il. 22. 401 f. He adds a caution against supposing that Servius’ source referred not only to Lycophron but also to other Greek (...) poets, ‘e.g. some Attic comedians’. That such allusions were in fact made in Comedy is proved by Pollux. (shrink)

Published here for the first time in paperback is much of a final and long-anticipated work on philosophy of history by the renowned Oxford philosopher, historian, and archaeologist R. G. Collingwood. The original text of this uncompleted work was only recently discovered in the archives of Oxford University Press. Also found there were two conclusions written by Collingwood for lectures which were eventually revised and published as The Idea of Nature, but which have relevance to his philosophy of history as (...) well. These pieces are included in this volume, accompanied by further short writings by Collingwood on historical knowledge and inquiry, selected from previously unpublished manuscripts held at the Bodleian Library, Oxford. All these writings, besides containing entirely new ideas, discuss further many of the issues which Collingwood is famous for having raised in The Idea of History and in his Autobiography.A lengthy editorial introduction sets these writings in their context, and discusses philosophical questions to which they give rise. The editors also consider why Collingwood left The Principles of History unfinished at his death, and what significance should be attached to the fact that it contains no reference to one of his best-known ideas: that of historical understanding as re-enactment. This volume will be a significant publication not just in Collingwood studies but in philosophy of history generally. (shrink)

The MS. tradition of Prudentius is particularly interesting, since in the famous Codex Puteanus we have a MS. dating from the early sixth century—i.e. but little more than a hundred years after the publication of the collected poems in 405. Yet it has only been of late years that due consideration has been given to this ancient Codex, which is the actual MS. corrected by Vettius Mavortius' own hand. Mr. Winstedt has spoken of the neglect which it has suffered for (...) the most part from editors, and also of the similar lack of attention paid even by Dressel to its seventh-century companion at Milan—the Codex Ambrosianus; while, later, J. Bergman shewed himself enthusiastic in its praise . A confirmation is now available of a curious and generally discredited reading in this MS. , from that same Arma glossary of ‘saec. viii.-ix’ which bears witness to the readings of a lost Terence MS. of the δ-family, the best minuscule family, older than any extant MS., as I shewed in the April, 1925, number of this journal. At Prud. Apoth. 895 the reading of Puteanus is— Agenitus genitusque deus, pater et patre natus. (shrink)

EMPIRICIST THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY STATE THAT THE IDENTITY OF A PERSON OVER TIME IS A MATTER OF BODILY CONTINUITY AND/OR SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER. IN CONTRAST, THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT WHILE BODILY CONTINUITY AND SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER ARE EVIDENCE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY, THEY DO NOT CONSTITUTE IT. IT IS SOMETHING UNDEFINABLE. THE DIFFICULTY OF KNOWING WHAT TO SAY IN PUZZLE CASES DOES NOT SHOW THAT PERSONAL IDENTITY EXISTS IN DIFFERENT DEGREES OR THAT WE HAVE TO MAKE (...) ARBITRARY JUDGMENTS ABOUT IT. IT SHOWS ONLY THAT SOMETIMES WE CANNOT KNOW WHO IS WHO. (shrink)